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Application of Transferred Intent to
Cases of Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress
The doctrine of transferred intent' is a legal fiction used in cases of
intentional torts. When the defendant either intends to cause harm to a
person other than the plaintiff2 or intends to cause a type of harm dif-
ferent from the actual injury suffered by the plaintiff,3 the tortious in-
tent is "transferred" to the resulting injury of the plaintiff rendering the
defendant liable for the harm he has caused. A good illustration is the
shooting hypothetical proposed by Dean Prosser.4 The defendant
shoots at a third person, intending either to hit or to scare him; he
misses his intended target and the bullet travels through a fence not
directly in the intended line of fire and strikes the plaintiff. The de-
fendant is unaware of the plaintiff's presence and could not reasonably
be expected to foresee the plaintiff's injury. There is no intent to injure
the plaintiff and there is no negligence toward him. Although the in-
jury to the plaintiff is accidental, the intent to commit an assault or
battery upon the third person is coupled with the plaintiff's injury to
render the defendant liable for battery.5 "The fact that the injury re-
sulted to another than was intended does not relieve the defendant
from responsibility."6
The origin of tansferred intent can be traced to the medieval criminal
law of England.7 In the seminal case of The Queen v. Saunders &
Archer,8 defendant John Saunders tried to kill his wife because he
wished to marry another woman. He put poison in a roasted apple and
gave it to his wife to eat while she was sick. She later gave a part of the
1. The classic article on the subject is Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 TEx. L. R. 650 (1967).
2. See Talmage v. Smith, 59 N.W. 656, 657 (Mich. 1894) (defendant threw a stick at one
person and unintentionally hit the plaintiff); see also Singer v. Marx, 144 Cal. App. 2d 637, 301
P.2d 440 (1956); Alteiri v. Colasso, 362 A.2d 798 (Conn. 1975).
3. See Brown v. Martinez, 361 P.2d 152, 159-60 (N.M. 1961) (defendant shot at trespassing
children to frighten them and unintentionally hit the plaintiff). See also Vandenburgh v. Truax, (4
Denio. 464) 47 American Decisions 268 (N.Y. 1847).
4. Prosser, supra note 1, at 650.
5. Id.
6. Talmage v. Smith, 59 N.W. 656, 657 (Mich. 1894).
7. See Agnes Gore's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 853, 854 (1611); The Queen v. Saunders and
Archer, 75 Eng. Rep. 706, 707-09 (1576); Regina v. Salisbury, 75 Eng. Rep. 158, 159-60 (1553). All
of these cases were felonies.
8. 75 Eng. Rep. 706 (1576).
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fruit to their infant daughter who ate it and died.9 Although Saunders
had no intent to poison his daughter, the court found him guilty of
murdering the child." The defendant's intent to kill his wife was at-
tached to the resulting death of his daughter; the court "transferred"
Saunders' criminal intent over to the death of his infant child.1 ' The
reasoning of the court is clear: the loss of a queen's subject caused by a
person who intended to kill should not go unpunished and the defend-
ant is not excused because he intended to kill another person.2
Transferred intent was first used in the emerging law of torts in Eng-
land, 3 late in the eighteenth century, to help define the cause of action
of trespass.' 4 The doctrine was used only once more in tort law in Eng-
land 5 and then mysteriously disappeared.' 6 In the United States, how-
ever, the doctrine has been applied in many intentional tort cases when
the defendant intended to injure a person other than the plaintiff' 7 and
when the defendant's actions formed the basis of an intentional tort
other than one that he intended.' 8
Perhaps in a mistaken belief that the doctrine originated in the old
common-law action of trespass,' 9 transferred intent has been restricted
to the five intentional torts that arose out of the trespass cause of action:
assault, battery, false imprisonment, trespass to chattels, and trespass to
land.20 The purpose of this comment is to show that the modem policy
reasons that support the application of transferred intent in these five
traditional intentional torts also support the application of this doc-
trine to the recently recognized 2' tort of intentional infliction of emo-
9. Id. at 707.
10. Id. at 708.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Scott v. Shepherd, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (1773).
14. Prichard, M.J., Scott v. Shepherd (1773) and the Emergence of the Tort of Negligence:
Selden Society lecture delivered in the Old Hall of Lincoln's Inn, July 4, 1973, 4-7 (Selden
Society, London, 1976).
15. James v. Campbell, 172 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (1832).
16. Prosser, supra note 1, at 654.
17. Lopez v. Surchia, 112 Cal. App 2d 314, 318, 246 P.2d 111, 113 (1952) (shooting); Carnes
v. Thompson, 48 S.W. 2d 903, 904 (Mo. 1932) (striking); Singer v. Marx, 144 Cal. App. 2d 637,
642, 301 P. 2d 440, 442-43 (1956) (rock-throwing).
18. Thus one who intends to frighten people by shooting at them (assault) is liable for battery
when the bullet unforeseeably hits a third person. Brown v. Martinez, 361 P.2d 152, 159-60 (N.M.
1961).
19. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 1, at 650. See infra text accompanying notes 84-136 (the
author's explanation of why the view is mistaken).
20. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 655.
21. The following states have now recognized intentional infliction of emotional distress as
an independent tort: Savage v. Boies, 272 P.2d 349 (Ariz. 1954); Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry.
v. Caple, 179 S.W.2d 151 (Ark. 1944); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330,
240 P.2d 282 (1952); Hiers v. Cohen 329 A.2d 609 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1973); Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Sheehan, 373 So. 2d 956 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Dawson v. Associates Financial Services Co.
of Kansas, 529 P.2d 104 (Kan. 1974); Knierim v. Izzo, 174 N.E.2d 157 (Ill. 1961); Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Burton, 12 N.E.2d 360 (Ind. App. 1938); Curnett-v. Wolf, 57 N.W.2d 915 (Iowa 1953);
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tional distress. This comment will document the history of transferred
intent and its relation to the medieval writ of trespass to determine if
historical reasons exist for limiting the doctrine to the traditional inten-
tional torts. This comment next will examine the public policy reasons
that preclude the use of transferred intent. Finally, a means of apply-
ing transferred intent to allow recovery in cases of intentional infliction
of emotional distress will be advanced. Since intentional infliction of
emotional distress is a cause of action that, in some respects, differs
from other intentional torts,2" a brief examination of the history and
characteristics of this tort2 3 is necessary to understand why transferred
intent has not yet been applied in cases of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress developed
slowly through case law during the course of the twentieth century.24
In California, the law did not accord independent legal protection to an
individual's interest in freedom from emotional anguish25 until 1952
when the California Supreme Court decided the landmark case of State
Rubbish Collector'sAss'n v. Siliznoff.2 6 Due to the recent recognition of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the full contours of this new
tort have not yet been developed 7 and in this respect, the law is clearly
in a process of growth.28 In particular, when intentionally tortious con-
duct is directed at a third person, the doctrine of transferred intent has
not been applied29 and courts have generally allowed the plaintiff to
recover only when the harm was reasonably foreseeable to the
defendant."
Quina v. Robert's, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. Ct. App. 1944); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N E.2d
315 (Mass. 1976); Warren v. June's Mobile Home Village & Sales, Inc., 239 N.W.2d 380 (Mich.
pp. 1976); Saenger Theatres Corp. v. Herndon, 178 So. 86 (Miss. 1938); La Salle Extension
iv. v. Fogarty, 253 N.W. 424 (Neb. 1934); Burrus v. Nevada, Cal., Or. R.R., 145 P. 926 (Nev.
1915), error dismissed, 244 U.S. 103 (1917); Mahunkashey v. Mahunkashey, 113 P.2d 190 (Okla.
1941); Rockhill v. Pollard, 485 P.2d 28 (Or. 1971); First Nat'l. Bank v. Bragdon, 167 N.W.2d 381
(S.D. 1969); Stafford v. Steward, 295 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Womack v. Eldridge, 210
S.E.2d 145 (Va. 1974); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp. 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash. 1977); Alsteen
v. Gehl, 124 N.W.2d 312 (Wis. 1963).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 187-92.
23. The classic article on this subject is Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the
Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REv. 1033 (1936).
24. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 51-60 (4th ed. 1971).
25. With the exception of the tort of assault, of course. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§24, comment c (1961).
26. 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 222 (1952).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §46, comment c (1961).
28. See id.; PROSSER, supra note 24, at 50.
29. See PROSSER, supra note 24, at 60-61.
30. See id.
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A. History
"Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend
to redress, when the unlawful act causes that alone, ' 31 said Lord Wen-
sleydale in the famous English case of Lynch v. Knight.32 His phrase
commanded uncritical acceptance by the courts until the beginning of
the twentieth century.33 Intentional infliction of emotional distress,
standing alone, could not support a cause of action 34 although if an
independent tort such as assault,35battery,36 or seduction37 could be
proved, damages for the resulting emotional distress could be recov-
ered.38  Injury from mental suffering alone was considered "too re-
mote" 39  or "easily feigned" 40  and judges feared that allowing a
recovery of damages for fright or shock would soon open a "wide
door '4 1 for injuries resting upon conjecture or speculation.4 2 Gradu-
ally, courts of law rejected these contentions, recognizing that the ner-
vous system is as much a part of the human body as bones or muscles.43
Decisions now recognize 4 that emotional damage is only slightly more
difficult to measure than physical pain45 and disturbance of emotional
tranquility is a natural consequence of certain types of outrageous con-
duct.46 An individual who, by extreme and outrageous conduct, inten-
tionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is
liable for the resulting mental harm.47
31. Lynch v. Knight, I1 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (1861).
32. Id.
33. Magruder, supra note 23, at 1033, 1035. Wilkinson v. Downton, 2 Q.B. 57 (1897) is gen-
erally thought to be the breakthrough case. See PROSSER, supra note 24, at 55.
34. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 49; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §46, comment b
(1961).
35. Kline v. Kline, 64 N.E. 9, 10 (Ind. 1902); Trogden v. Terry, 90 S.E. 583, 585 (N.C. 1916).
36. Draper v. Baker, 21 N.W. 527, 530 (Wis. 1884); Williams v. Underhill, 71 N.Y.S. 291,
292-93 (App. Div. 1901).
37. Anthony v. Norton, 56 P. 529, 530 (Kan. 1899).
38. Justice Traynor recognized this anomaly and used it as the overriding factor in recogniz-
ing the independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. State Rubbish Collectors
Ass'n v. S iznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (1952).
39. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Gelvin, 238 F. 14, 24 (1917).
40. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 355 (N.Y. 1896).
41. 238 F. at 24.
42. See PROSSER, supra note 24, at 49-5 1.
43. See Watson v. Dilts, 89 N.W. 1068, 1069 (Iowa 1902); Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 50
N.W. 1034, 1035 (Minn. 1892).
44. See Knierim v. Izzo, 174 N.E. 2d 157, 163-65 (Ill. 1961) (for an excellent summary
describing the establishment of intentional infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort).
45. Hargis v. Knoxville Power Co., 94 S.E. 702, 703 (N.C. 1917). See Goodrich, Emotional
Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REv. 497, 503-06 (1922).
46. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 51; Throckmorton, Damages For Fright, 34 HARV. L. REV.
260, 268-72 (1921). See Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 73 So. 205, 207 (Ala. 1916).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 comment d (1961). "Liability has been found
only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency .... Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of
the facts to an average member of the community would lead him to exclaim 'Outrageous'." Id.
See also PROSSER, supra note 24, at 56.
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For many years, courts would not allow recovery for either negli-
gently or intentionally inflicted emotional distress unless the plaintiff
suffered physical harm such as a miscarriage or physical shock.48 This
was believed to be an additional guarantee of the sincerity of the plain-
tiff's claim.4 9 In 1952, the California Supreme Court eliminated this
requirement in State Rubbish Collector's Ass'n v. Siliznoffl ° establish-
ing intentional infliction of emotional distress as an independent cause
of action. Plaintiffs no longer need to suffer any physical consequences
from the defendant's conduct to recover.5 t The court, recognizing that
claims for mental suffering often are a major element in damages for
other torts,5 2 stated: "...it is anomalous to deny recovery because the
defendant's intentional misconduct fell short of producing some physi-
cal injury."53
Intentional infliction of emotional distress is now a clearly recog-
nized, independent tort.54 A California court of appeal recently stated:
The argument that emotional disturbance is a trivial injury, not
equal with physical injury, is an antiquated concept which the ad-
vance of modem psychology has repudiated; research has shown that
mental trauma can be just as debilitating as a physical paralysis.55
Emotional damage is now recognized as equal to the harm resulting
from other intentional torts. 56
Clearly, a developing trend in tort law is bringing the intentional
infliction cause of action within the body of law common to the tradi-
tional intentional torts. 7 The doctrine of transferred intent, although
consistently applied to the traditional intentional torts, 58 has not been
used in cases of intentional infliction of emotional distress.5 9 When in-
tentional harm is directed at a person other than the plaintiff6 or when
48. See Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 111 Cal. 668, 680, 44 P. 320, 322 (1896); PROSSER
supra note 24, at 59-60.
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46, comment k (1961); PROSSER, supra note 24,
at 59-60.
50. 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952).
51. Id. at 338, 240 P.2d at 286.
52. Id.; see, e.g., Deevey v. Tassi, 21 Cal. 2d 109, 120, 130 P.2d 389, 396 (1942).
53. 38 Cal. 2d at 338, 240 P.2d at 286.
54. See generaly 23 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 185-2 19 (1969).
55. Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 933, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470,
481 (1975).
56. Liability for the several established intentional torts is proven when the elements of the
tort itself are established, therefore no special element of damages need be shown. See PROSSER,
supra note 24, at 35, 38, 43. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §870, comments a,
c (1961).
57. See Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal. App. 2d 124, 130-31, 217 P.2d 113, 117 (1950). See
generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §46 (1948 Supplement) at 616; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS §46, comment c (1961).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 153-70.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46, comment 1 (1961) See cases cited in notes 153-
62, infra.
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the defendant intends to invade a plaintiffs legally protected interest
other than freedom from emotional distress, 61 the doctrine of trans-
ferred intent is not applied62 even though the defendant's acts caused
the plaintiff to suffer severe mental harm. For reasons that will be
made clear,63 the law has not expanded the application of transferred
intent to cases of intentional infliction of emotional distress and there-
fore has not given equal recognition to this new tort. Instead, as the
next section of this comment demonstrates, plaintiffs are limited to stat-
ing a cause of action when the defendant has either intentionally or
negligently caused the plaintiffs emotional distress.
B. Limitations on Recoveryfor Emotional Distress When The
Defendant's Conduct is Directed at a Third Person
When the defendant directs extreme and outrageous conduct at a
third person and the plaintiff suffers resulting severe emotional dis-
tress, courts have been hesitant to allow a recovery.64 As commentators
have noted,65 the doctrine of transferred intent, applied in similar cir-
cumstances to other intentional torts,6 6 is not used in cases of emotional
distress. 67 With one exception, 68 courts have allowed the plaintiff to
recover only under circumstances in which the defendant could reason-
ably have anticipated the plaintiffs emotional disturbance.69
Courts have used two theories-intentional tort and negligence-to
allow plaintiffs a recovery of damages for emotional distress when they
were not the intended victims. 70 First, under an intentional tort theory,
courts have imposed liability on defendants when their outrageous con-
duct was so substantially certain to cause the plaintiffs emotional dis-
tress that, under the circumstances, their conduct must be treated as
intended to cause emotional distress in the plaintiff as well as in any
third persons." Second, under a negligence theory, liability is based
upon the view that the defendant's intentionally harmful conduct di-
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §47 (1961).
62. See infra text accompanying notes 153-66.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 167-70.
64. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 59-60; see, e.g., Taylor v. Vallelunga, 171 Cal. App. 2d 107,
339 P.2d 910 (1959)(discussed infra in text accompanying notes 76-80).
65. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 657; Magruder, supra note 23, at 1042.
66. See, e.g., Brown v. Martinez, 361 P.2d 152, 159-60 (N.M. 1961) (defendant fired a gun to
frighten trespassing children and unforeseeably hit the plaintiff).
67. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 46, comment 1 (1961).
68. Lambert v. Brewster, 125 S.E. 244 (W. Va. 1924) (discussed extensively infra in text ac-
companying notes 173-79).
69. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 60-6 1.
70. Id.
71. See Rogers v. Williard, 223 S.W. 15 (Ark. 1920); Jeppsen v. Jensen, 155 P. 429 (Utah
1916); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46, comment 1 (1961).
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rected at a third person is also negligence toward bystanders when
under the circumstances, there is an unreasonable risk that a bystander
will suffer bodily harm or emotional distress from the defendant's
acts. 2 In all of these cases, recovery has been limited to plaintiffs who
were present at the time of the tortious conduct 73 and whose presence
was known to the defendant.74 Under both theories, unless the plain-
tiff's emotional injury is reasonably foreseeable to the defendant at the
time of his tortious actions, the court will deny the plaintiff a recovery
for emotional distress caused by the defendant's conduct.7 5
Under the intentional tort theory, when the facts of a case do not
allow the court to infer that the defendant intended his tortious conduct
toward theplaintif', recovery is denied. In the California case of Taylor
v. Vallelunga,76 plaintiff Gail Taylor alleged that she witnessed a beat-
ing upon her father which caused her severe fright and emotional dis-
tress.77 A California court of appeal held that the plaintiff could not
recover because she did not plead that the defendants intended to cause
her emotional distress. The court deftned "intent" as acts done by the
defendants for the purpose of causing her distress or acts done with
knowledge on the part of the defendants that severe emotional distress
would be substantially certain to be produced by their conduct.7" The
case was dismissed.79 Similarly, under the negligence theory, if the
plaintiff's emotional harm is not reasonably foreseeable to the defend-
ant at the time, recovery is also denied. 0
Using these two theories of recovery, courts have required that the
plaintiff's emotional distress be reasonably foreseeable to the defend-
ant, therefore, the application of transferred intent has effectively been
precluded in cases of emotional distress.8' When a defendant intends
72. See Hill v. Kimball, 13 S.W. 59, 59-60 (Tex. 1890).
73. Apparently no reported case exists which allows recovery when the plaintiff was not pres-
ent at the time of the defendant's tortious conduct. Magruder, supra note 23, at 1044, (cited in
PROSSER, supra note 24 at 61, n.3 1). See e.g., Koontz v. Keller, 3 N.E.2d 694 (Ohio Ct. App.
1936).
74. Goddard v. Walters, 82 S.E. 304, 305-06 (Ga. App. Ct. 1914); Reed v. Ford, 112 S.W.
600, 601 (Ky. 1908); Phillips v. Dickerson, 85 Ill. 11, 14-16 (1877); Hutchinson v. Stem, 101
N.Y.S. 145, 146 (N.Y. App. Div. 1906).
75. See PROSSER, supra note 24, at 60-6 1.
76. 171 Cal. App. 2d 107, 339 P.2d 910 (1959); see also Vescovo v. New Way Enterprises, Ltd.
60 Cal. App. 3d 582, 588, 130 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89-90 (1976).
77. 171 Cal. App. 2d at 109, 339 P.2d at 911.
78. Id. The court referred to Illus. 3 of the Restatement (First) of Torts §46 (1948 Supp.): "A
is sitting on her front porch watching her husband B, who is standing on the sidewalk. C, who
hates B and is friendly to A, whosepresence is known to him, stabs B, killing him. C is liable to A
for the mental anguish, grief and horror he causes." (Emphasis added by the court). Id.
79. Id. at 110, 339 P.2d at 912.
80. See cases cited infra notes 153, 158, 162.
81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46, comment 1 (1961). When the defendant
intends a tortious interference with the plaintiff and plaintiffs only resulting injury is emotional
distress, the tort is not transferred and recovery is also denied. See id. §47.
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to harm a third person, this intent cannot be "transferred" to the emo-
tional distress suffered by the plaintiff because the mental injury must
be foreseeable to the defendant.
Commentators have advanced both historical82 and public policy
83
reasons to justify the preclusion of transferred intent from cases of
emotional distress. The next section of this comment will trace the de-
velopment of transferrred intent and examine the historical justifica-
tions for limiting the doctrine to the traditional intentional torts.
TRANSFERRED INTENT
The legal fiction of transferring a defendant's wrongful intent origi-
nally was first used in English criminal cases during the sixteenth cen-
tury. 4 Transferred intent was not applied in a civil case until two hun-
dred years later when an English Assize Court used the concept in a
trespass action of battery. 5 The doctrine remained peculiar to trespass
cases of battery for almost a century afterwards. The application of
transferred intent was not expanded to other intentional torts until the
distinction between the actions of trespass and case had become unim-
portant, and liability became more dependent upon the intention of the
defendant. 6
A. Development From Appeals of Felony
Legal historians are in disagreement as to the origins of the medieval
cause of action known as trespass,87 but clearly this action had mixed
civil and criminal elements.88 The essence of the action was a com-
plaint brought by a private individual asserting damages for the de-
fendant's direct interference with the person or property of the
accuser.8 9 Every action of trespass brought in the royal courts also as-
serted a breach of the king's peace,90 in the sense that the alleged ac-
tions were a violation of the king's law.9' Defendants convicted in a
trespass action faced imprisonment unless they paid a fine directly to
the king's treasury.92 The writ of trespass was aimed at both a punitive
82. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 652-58.
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46, comment 1 (1961).
84. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 112-24 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
87. See FIFOoT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW ch. 3 (1949) (explanation of
the various theories of the origin of the writ of trespass).
88. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 572-73 (1895).
89. FIFOOT, supra note 87, at 46.
90. Id. at 44-45; MILsOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 283, 286-87 (2d
ed. 1981).
91. MILSOM, supra note 90, at 286.
92. POLLOCK, supra note 88, at 464.
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and exemplary result,93 and dealt with certain wrongs that today,
would be considered both criminal and civil.94 Therefore, in this sense,
a cause of action in trespass can be considered as both a tort and a
crime.
Dean Prosser, in his article on transferred intent, 95 asserts that the
origins of this doctrine "lie deep in the old common-law action of tres-
pass;"' 96 yet the first cases in which the fiction was used were appeals of
felony,97 a cause of action distinct from trespass.98 Felonies were
purely criminal in character and the king's courts were understandably
concerned with punishment of killers whose only mistake was the iden-
tity of their victim.99 Even if the trespass writ did develop from appeals
of felony,"° at the time of the first cases of transferred intent' ° ' the two
actions were clearly separate, each one having distinctive
characteristics.10 2
Although the action of trespass retained criminal characteristics until
the seventeenth century,10 3 the writ was clearly developing toward a
purely civil action throughout its history. In the thirteenth century, ac-
cusations of a "ficticious" breach of the king's peace were placed in
writs of trespass to gain the jurisdiction of royal courts1" and by the
late fourteenth century the king's courts were hearing the writs without
the allegation of contrapacem regis.'0 5 In these writs of trespass, the
royal courts insisted on plaintiffs explanation of how the defendant's
conduct amounted to a wrong against him, even though the conduct
did not amount to a breach of the king's peace. 106 By the early six-
teenth century, at the time of the first appearance of transferred intent
in felony cases, the meaning of contra pacem in trespass writs had been
reduced to a nominal fine paid to the king.0 7 While the writ of tres-
pass rapidly developed into a purely civil action, 108 appeals of felony
93. Id. at 573.
94. Thus one writ of trespass asserted assault, battery, robbery, and "other outrages." Lori-
mer v. Comyn, 55 Selden Society Reports 64 (1280). See FIFOOT, supra note 87, at 55;
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 458 (5th ed. 1956). See generally FINCH,
H., SIR, A SUMMARY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND, tables 12, 14, 15 (London, 1654).
95. Prosser, supra note 1.
96. Id. at 650.
97. See note 7, supra.
98. POLLOCK, supra note 88, at 464-67, 572; Milsom, supra note 90, at 285.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 11 and 12.
100. The theory is discussed in FIFOOT, supra note 87, at 44-47.
101. The late 16th century. See supra note 7.
102. See MILsOM, supra note 90, at 404.
103. Prosser, supra note I, at 651.
104. MILsoM, supra note 90, at 287, 288-89; POLLOCK, supra note 88, at 464.
105. MILSOM, supra note 90, at 291.
106. Prichard, supra note 14, at 8.
107. MILSOM, supra note 90, at 309.
108. POLLOCK, supra note 88, at 464; PLUCKNETT, supra note 94, at 458.
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remained a distinct group of crimes broadly marked off from other of-
fenses."0 9 Felonies were unemendable crimes that deserved a judgment
of maiming or death and forfeiture of property to the lord and king."I°
Limited to cases of a felony, transferred intent was not applied in a
civil case until the late eighteenth century when trespass actions had
become purely civil in character."'
B. Application in Tort
Transferred intent was not carried over from the criminal law into
cases of tort because of their common origins in the writ of trespass,
rather the doctrine was applied in the eighteenth century battery case
of Scott v. Shepherd"2 to help define the writ of trespass." 3 In this
celebrated English case," 4 the defendant Shepherd threw a lighted
squib," 5 made of gunpowder and other combustibles, into a crowded
market-house on a fair day at Milbourne Port. The squib fell next to a
bystander, Willis, who "instantly and to prevent injury to himself and
the wares of William Yates"' "16 threw it across the square; the squib
next fell close to another bystander, Ryal, who also threw it away to
prevent his own injury. The squib's final resting place was near the
plaintiff's face where it exploded and put out one of his eyes.' '7 Scott
sued Shepherd for the damage to his eye in an action of trespass.""
The decision of the court assumes the liability of the defendant) 9
The only issue was whether, on the facts of the case, the plaintiff should
bring an action in trespass or sue on the case.' 20 The justices took the
settled distinction to be that when the injury is immediate and direct an
action of trespass will lie, whereas, when damages are only consequent-
ial an action on the case must be brought.' 2' The majority of justices
believed that the injury to Scott was the direct result of Shepherd's acts,
therefore the action for trespass would lie in the circumstances of this
109. POLLOCK, supra note 88, at 470. "The word felony is also being used to signify the moral
guilt which deserves a punishment of the highest order. Homicide by felony is frequently con-
trasted with homicide by self-defense. ." Id. at 468.
110. See MILsOM, supra note 90, at 405-06; 0. PHILLIPS & A. HUDSON, A FIRST BOOK OF
ENGLISH LAW 269 (7th ed. 1977).
111. See supra notes 103-08.
112. 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (1773).
113. Prichard, supra note 14, at 4.
114. See id. at 1.
115. A firecracker that hisses and spurts, ending in an explosion. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTI-
ETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1765 (2d ed. 1960).
116. 96 Eng. Rep. at 526.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 525.
119. Id. at 526; see Prichard, supra note 14, at 4.
120. 96 Eng. Rep. at 526; Prichard, supra note 14, at 4.
121. 96 Eng. Rep. at 526, 528. See generally MILSOM, supra note 90, at 312-13 (for discussion
of the distinction).
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case: 122
The throwing [of] the squib was an act unlawful. . . So far mis-
chief was originally intended. . . .Whatever mischief therefore fol-
lows, he is the author of it: Egrediturpersonam, as the phrase is in
criminal cases. And though criminal cases are no rule for civil ones,
yet in trepass I think there is a analogy. Every one who does an
unlawful act is considered as the doer of all that follows.' 2 3
As part of Chief Judge de Grey's strained effort'2 4 to classify plaintiffs
injuries as the direct result of the defendant's actions, the principle of
transferred intent was used.
These cases demonstrate that transferred intent did not originate in
writs of trespass. The doctrine actually was borrowed from the criminal
law and used to bring cases of battery in which the defendant did not
intend harm to the plaintiff within the scope of the trespass cause of
action. ' 25The concern of the courts was in the distinction between di-
rect and consequential harm: 126the difference between actions of tres-
pass and case.' 27 The plaintiffs tortious intent to commit a battery
made any resulting harm direct damage that was therefore within the
scope of the trespass cause of action. 28  Each intentional tort had de-
veloped specific elements that stated a cause of action 29 and trans-
ferred intent became a means of establishing the direct causal relation
between the defendant's acts and the plaintiffs harm in cases of
battery. 130
Transferred intent was not expanded to other intentional torts until
the distinction between the writs of trespass and case had become un-
important.' 3' As the old forms of pleading disappeared, a modern con-
ception of liability dependent mainly upon the intention of the actor
122. 96 Eng. Rep. at 526, 527, 528 (Nares, J.; Gould, J.; De Grey, C.J.).
123. Id. at 528 (opinion of De Grey, CJ.).
124. Prichard, supra note 14, at 4.
125. In addition to Scott v. Shepherd, see also James v. Campbell, 172 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016
(1832) (defendant, fighting with a third person, swung and unintentionally hit the plaintiff).
126. See supra text accompanying note 123. The emphasis was on the relation between the act
and the injury. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 218 (1956).
127. See Prichard, supra note 14, at 6.
128. See supra text accompanying note 122.
129. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ch. 2, introductory note (1961).
130. See Anderson v. Arnold's Ex'r., 79 Ky. 370, 372-73 (1881). See also STREET, 1 FOUNDA-
TIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY, TORTS 4-5 (1906).
131. In Vandenburgh v. Truax (4 Denio. 464) 47 American Decisions 268 (N.Y. 1847), the
defendant was chasing a boy with a pick-ax and the boy ran into the plaintiff's store and knocked
the faucet from a cask of wine, spilling the contents. The court found the defendant liable, stating:
"When one does an illegal or mischievous act, which is likely to prove injurious to others [tortious
intent]... he is answerable, in someform of action, for all the consequences which may directly
and naturally result from his conduct." (emphasis added). Id. at 269. The court added: "It is not
necessary to inquire whether the action should be trespass or case; for this declaration may as well
be considered one thing as the other..." Id. at 271.
In Dangerfield v. Thompson, 74 Va. (33 Gratt. 136) 402 (1880) defendant shot at the plaintiff's
door and unintentionally hit the plaintiff. The court declared: "allegations of this declara-
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developed.' 32 Indirect or intervening forces causing the plaintiff's harm
generally do not prevent an imposition of liability on the defendant
when his tortious conduct is intentional.133 As courts began emphasiz-
ing the defendant's intent to commit a wrongful act, 134 transferred in-
tent was applied to other intentional torts. 35 Thus, application of
transferred intent cannot be limited to the traditional torts on a histori-
cal basis: transferred intent was not used in civil cases until the eight-
eenth century and the doctrine did not share its origins in the old writs
of trespass with the traditional intentional torts.
After the disappearance of the medieval forms of pleading, courts
began to transfer the tortious intent of defendants to the resulting inju-
ries of plaintiffs in an increasing number of cases. 136 Instead of serving
to fulfill the technical requirements of the writ of trespass in battery
cases, however, modem policy reasons developed to support the appli-
cation of transferred intent in other intentional tort cases.
C. Modern Public Policy Reasons Supporting Transferred Intent
The policy reasons justifying the use of transferred intent in the older
criminal cases were similar to those used to support the application of
the doctrine in early tort decisions as well. 13  Defendants were held
liable for all the natural consequences of their unlawful or wanton orig-
inal acts, however remote. 38 A person was presumed to intend the con-
sequences of his unlawful act because the act itself was wrong and the
accidental nature of the injury to another person could not be used to
excuse the defendant from liability. 139 More recent decisions have em-
phasized policies supporting transferred intent that have broadened
tion. . .certainly make out a case for trespass. . . . And under our statute, wherever an action of
trespass will lie, trespass on the case may be maintained .. " Id. at 404.
In Rex v. Huggins, 92 Eng. Rep. 518 (K.B. 1730) a warden of the Fleet Street prison was held
guilty of murder because he unlawfully detained the decedent, a prisoner, within a dangerously
unclean room. Dean Prosser cites this case as an example of transferred intent applied to false
imprisonment but a close examination reveals the court held that the defendant intended the
murder of the decedent, or, in the alternative, that the defendant knew to a substantial certainty
the decedent would at least suffer grave harm. 1d. at 521-22.
132. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 127, at 218.
133. Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 907-09, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28, 35-36 (1960). See
HARPER & JAMES, supra note 112, at 218. See generally Note, The Tie That Binds: Liability of
Intentional Tort-Feasorsfor Extended Consequences, 14 STAN. L. REv. 362 (1952).
134. See Vandenburgh v. Truax, (4 Denio. 464) 47 American Decisions 268 at 269.
135. See, e.g., Du Lac v. Perma Trans Products, Inc., 103 Cal. App. 3d 937, 943.44, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 335, 338 (1980).
136. See generally Prosser, supra note 1, at 655, n.n. 35, 36, 37.
137. Compare cases cited supra note 7, with case cited supra note 12.
138. See Isham v. Dow's Estate, 41 A. 585, 585 (Vt.1898) (defendant shot plaintiff's dog which
ran into plaintiff, knocking her down); see also Wyant v. Crouse, 86 N.W. 527, 529 (Mich. 1901);
Drum v. Miller, 47 S.E. 421, 422 (N.C. 1904).
139. See Carnes v. Thompson, 48 S.W.2d 903, 904 (Mo. 1932) (defendant struck at plaintiff's
husband with pliers, hitting plaintiff).
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and refined the base upon which this doctrine stands. These cases of
unprivileged intentional harm place the risk of this conduct upon the
intentional wrongdoer rather than upon his innocent victim. 140
As long as the principle of compensation in tort cases is based largely
upon the concept of the defendant's fault,' the moral culpability of
the defendant's conduct will be a strong factor in deciding liability. 42
Aside from moral delinquency, conduct intended to cause harm has
much less "social utility" than acts that negligently cause injury.1
While liability in negligence cases is generally limited to the risks of
reasonably foreseeable harm, 14 this limitation is not applied to cases in
which the defendant intended to cause harm. 145 The problem of actual
causation is the same in cases of negligence, reckless misconduct, and
intentional wrongs, but the rules determining the limits of compensa-
tion for remote harm are most severe upon the intentional wrong-
doer. 41 Part of this severity is the doctrine of transferred intent. 147
When the plaintiff suffers severe emotional distress as a result of the
defendant's intentionally tortious conduct, transferred intent is not ap-
plied by the courts. 48 As Dean Prosser has noted,149 there seems to be
little reason to apply the fiction when the plaintiff suffers physical
harm, and to reject it when mental damage is inflicted. 5 ° As between
an innocent plaintiff suffering mental distress and the defendant who
intended harm toward another person, it would seem an obvious sense
140. See PROSSER, supra note 24, at 18-19.
141. See Vold, LegalAlloation ofRisk in Assault, Battery andImprisonment, 17 NEB. L. BULL.
149, 163 (1938).
142. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel, & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 314-15, 379 P.2d 513, 525, 29
Cal. Rptr. 33, 45, (1963); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 100 (1968); see Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault as Affecting Defendant's Liability, 81 U.
PA. L. REv. 586, 588-92 (1933); PROSSER, supra note 24, at 30-3 1.
143. 59 Cal. 2d at 314-15, 379 P.2d at 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
144. See generally HARPER & JAMEs, supra note 127, at 929-30; PROSSER, supra note 24, at
145-46.
145. 59 Cal. 2d at 314-15, 379 P.2d at 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 45. The limitation on liability for
defendants engaged in intentionally tortious conduct is not foreseeability, but rather a concept of
"natural" outcome. "In the later case [intentional wrong] the defendant is liable for any conse-
quence that may flow from his act as the proximate cause thereof, whether he could foresee or
anticipate it or not .. " Drum v. Miller, 47 S.E. 421, 423 (N.C. 1904); see also Huckeby v.
Spangler, 521 S.W.2d 568, 574 (Tenn. 1975).
146. Bauer, supra note 142, at 588. "Causation, as distinguished from duty, is purely a matter
of producing a subsequent event. In determining how far the law will trace causation and afford a
remedy, the facts as to the defendant's intent, his imputable knowledge, or his justifiable igno-
rance are often taken into account. The moral element is here the factor that has turned close
cases one way or the other. For an intended injury the law is astute to discover even very remote
causation." Derosier v. New England T. & T. Co., 130 A. 145, 152 (N.H. 1925) (Snow, J.).
147. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.).
148. See infra text accompanying notes 152-67.
149. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 60.
150. Compare Corn v. Sheppard, 229 N.W. 869, 871 (Minn. 1930) (recovery allowed when
defendant shot at a dog, missed, and unforeseeably hit plaintiff) with Renner v. Canfield, 30 N.W.
435, 435-36 (Minn. 1886) (recovery denied when defendant shot at a dog and unforeseeably
caused emotional shock to the nearby plaintiff).
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of justice to place liability on the guilty party.'-" In the next section,
this comment will briefly describe several important decisions exempli-
fying the refusal of courts to apply transferred intent to cases of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.
D. Transferred Intent in Cases of Emotional Distress
Courts consistently refuse to transfer the defendant's tortious intent
to the plaintiff's resulting severe emotional distress. Recovery is denied
if the plaintiffs harm was unforeseeable to the defendant at the time of
his acts. ' 52
In Phillps v. Dickerson, the plaintiff overheard defendant threaten
her husband with a knife.' 54 The plaintiff heard the exchange from her
bed in a room that opened onto the back porch where the incident took
place.' 55 As a result of the assault on her husband, the plaintiff began
suffering pains that eventually resulted in a miscarriage.' 56 The court
declined to hold the defendant liable since there was no evidence that
he knew of the plaintiff's presence and could not reasonably have fore-
seen the results of his misconduct. ' 5
7
In Goddard v. Waters 58 the defendant assaulted the plaintiff's hus-
band in front of their home with a revolver.' 59 Plaintiff, who watched
the incident from the front door of the house, suffered severe emotional
distress and eventually had a miscarriage. 160 The court held that the
plaintiff could not recover since the acts complained of were not di-
rected at her, nor was it foreseeable to the defendant that she would
suffer any injuries.' 6 1
In Ellsworth v. Massacar,162 the defendants forcibly abducted the
plaintiff's husband and later forced him to submit to various indigni-
ties 63 designed to test his loyalty to America. 64 The plaintiff, although
151. Prosser, supra note I at 661.
152. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
153. 85 Ill. 11 (1877).
154. Id. at 12-13.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 15.
158. 82 S.E. 304 (Ga. 1914).
159. Id. at 304.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 305-06.
162. 184 N.W. 408 (Mich. 1921).
163. The plaintiff was tricked into coming out of his house late at night, forcibly abducted
(while being "cursed, kicked, and struck") and then taken to a piece of woods about a mile from
his home. He was forcibly led to a tree by a group of men with a rope and threatened with
hanging if he did not recant his allegedly pro-German allegiance and disloyalty to America during
the First World War. Apparently he had found fault with the bread that Americans had to eat
during the war years andhis abductors believed he had failed to contribute his share to the Red
Cross and Liberty bonds. He denied the accusations and later took an oath of allegiance to vary-
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not actually a witness to the abduction, saw the defendants forcibly
detain her husband outside of their home. 65 The court held that the
defendants were not liable for her resulting emotional distress. 166
The factor tying these cases together is the unforeseeability of the
plaintiff's mental distress: the defendant could not have reasonably an
ticipated that his acts would cause the plaintiff emotional injury. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts supports these decisions by requiring
that the defendant know to a substantial certainty that plaintiff's emo-
tional distress will result from his acts. 167 The commentators to the
Restatement offer two public policy reasons to deny recovery for un-
foreseeable emotional distress resulting from intentional conduct di-
rected at a third person: 168 unlimited liability for the defendant' 69 and
insincerity of emotional distress claims. 7 ° The next section of this
comment will demonstrate that the application of transferred intent in
cases of intentional inffiction of emotional distress will allow a class of
plaintiffs who have suffered severe emotional harm at the hands of an
intentional wrongdoer a right to recover for their injuries without dis-
turbing the policies expressed in the Restatement.
APPLICATION OF TRANSFERRED INTENT TO CASES OF INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
As long as a defendant's reasonable anticipation of the plaintiff's
emotional harm is required for recovery in cases in which the defend-
ant's outrageous conduct is not directed at the plaintiff,'7 transferred
intent will never be applied to intentional infliction of emotional dis-
ing governmental bodies "right on down to the school board" and concluded the ceremony by
kissing an American flag. The plaintiff was then peacefully returned to his home. Id. at 408-09.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 410.
166. Id.
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46, comment 1 (1961).
168. The Restatement also denies recovery when the defendant intended a tortious act other
than infliction of emotional distress toward the plaintiff and the only resulting harm is plaintiff's
severe emotional distress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §47 (1961). "When a defend-
ant's conduct is tortious solely because it involves a risk of invading an interest other than the
interest in freedom from emotional distress, the tortious quality of the act is insufficient to create
liability for emotional distress alone." Id., comment a. The author will leave for another com-
ment discussion of which types of conduct, short of tortious interference, may make a defendant
liable for a plaintiffs resulting emotional distress. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §870 (1961).
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46, comment 1 (1961). The authors state: "The
limitation may be justified by the practical necessity of drawing the line somewhere, since the
number of persons who may suffer emotional distress at the news of an assassination of the Presi-
dent is virtually unlimited...". Id.
170. Id.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 153-70.
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tress.72 The West Virginia case of Lambert v. Brewster t7 3 is the only
case attacking the requirement of foreseeability of the plaintiffs mental
injury.'74 In Lambert, the plaintiff and her husband lived on premises
adjacent to that of her father, Mr. Wingo. One evening the defendant,
who lived nearby, came up to Wingo's gate and called out to him about
a dispute involving the defendant's children. They had a heated con-
versation that led to the defendant striking Wingo. Unknown to the
defendant, Mrs. Lambert viewed the whole encounter from her door-
step, became extremely upset and ultimately had a miscarriage. 75
After finding that the plaintiffs injuries were a direct result of the de-
fendant's acts, the court dismissed the defendant's argument that inju-
ries from emotional distress are compensable only when defendant's
actions were directed at the person injured.' 76 "If defendant's wrongful
act is the proximate cause of injury to plaintiff, of the character for
which the law allows compensation, then the question of whether de-
fendant could or should have foreseen the result becomes immate-
rial."' 77 Even though the defendant did not know of the plaintiff's
presence and therefore could not foresee the results of his tortious con-
duct, he was not excused from liability. 78
The Lambert court did not require the defendant to reasonably an-
ticipate the plaintiffs emotional distress, emphasizing that foreseeabil-
ity should not be a limitation on recovery in cases of intentional
torts.'79 Other decisions have recognized that a defendant's liability for
the harm resulting from deliberate tortious conduct extends to conse-
quences which he did not intend and could not reasonably have fore-
seen. '8 In actions of negligence, the imposition of liability is
dependent upon the concept of reasonable foreseeability of risk toward
the plaintiff. 8 ' If the defendant's conduct foreseeably involves an un-
reasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff, then the defendant owes the
plaintiff a duty to use due care to avoid an injury.'8 2 This concept of
172. This is because transferred intent is completely divorced from any concept of foreseeabil-
ity of harm. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
173. 125 S.E. 244 (W. Va. 1924).
174. See PROSSER, supra note 20, at 61 n.27.
175. 125 S.E. at 244-45.
176. Id. at 250.
177. Id. at 245.
178. Id.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 177-78; see also Harris v. Hindman, 278 P. 954, 956
(Or. 1929).
180. See cases cited in PROSSER, supra note 24, at 31, notes 24-26.
181. Palsgrafv. Long Island R. R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99-100, (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.); see
HARPER & JAMES, supra note 127, at 929-30, 1018; PROSSER, supra note 24, at 145-46, 254-55.
182. HARPER & JAME s,supra note 127, at 1018. This is the majority view in the United States.
Under a minority view, a duty is owed to the whole world with respect to an injury that might be
caused by negligent conduct. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting opinion).
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duty evolved during the industrial revolution, and courts probably
chose this means to limit the responsibilities of growing commerce and
industry within reasonable bounds.' 83 This policy limitation has no ap-
plication in intentional tort cases. Foreseeability of injury should not
be required in cases of intentional torts.1 4 When a defendant intends a
tortious interference, he is liable for the results, even though unin-
tended, unforeseeable, and not directed at the plaintiff.'85
Once foreseeability of the plaintiff's harm is eliminated as a require-
ment of recovery in cases of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
the only essential remaining policy obstacle preventing an application
of transferred intent is a reasonable limitation on the defendant's liabil-
ity.' 18 6 The remaining portion of this comment will focus on applying
transferred intent to protect a class of plaintiffs previously denied re-
covery without imposing unlimited liability upon defendants.
A. Reasonable Application of Transferred Intent in Cases of
Emotional Distress Based on the Tort of Assault
The torts of assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress
share a common characteristic: protection of an individual's interest in
freedom from mental invasion. 8 7 In contrast, a battery,18 8 false im-
prisonment,18 9 trespass to chattels,' 90 or trespass to land' 9' is a physical
invasion and can be accomplished without the plaintiffs knowledge at
the time it takes place. A later discovery of the invasion is sufficient to
maintain a cause of action.' 92
The interest protected in an action for assault is a mental one of free-
dom from apprehension of physical contact: ". . .there is a touching of
the mind, if not the body."' 193 The plaintiff must be aware of the de-
183. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 734, 441 P.2d 912, 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76, (1968);
PROSSER, supra note 24, at 325, James, Tort Law in Midstrear Its Challenge to the Judicial Pro-
cess, 8 BUFF. L. REV. 315, 31617 (1959).
184. See generally PROSSER, supra note 24, at 325.
185. See supra cases cited in notes 112, 146, 173, 180; see also supra notes 141-47 and accom-
panying text.
186. See supra text accompanying note 167; Magruder, supra note 23, at 1043, n.40.
187. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 49.
188. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905); Hively v. Higgs, 253 P. 363, 365 (Ore.
1927). See PROSSER, supra note 24, at 35.
189. Prosser, False Imprisonment: Consciousness of Confinement, 55 COLUM. L. Rav. 847, 850
(1955). Very young children, and extremely ill people could be confined without their knowledge
and suffer real damage. See, e.g., Barker v. Washburn, 93 N.E. 958 (N.Y. 1911) (idiot); Com-
monwealth v. Nickerson, 87 Mass. 518 (1861) (child four years old). But see RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS §42 (1961).
190. Juniata Acceptance Corp. v. Hoffman, I1 A.2d 494, 496 (Pa. 1940). This is the modern
view. See PROSSER, supra note 24, at 78.
191. Miller v. Miller, 41 Md. 623, 631 (1874); Dodson v. Culp, 133 S.E.2d 631, 634 (Ga. 1963).
See PROSSER, supra note 24, at 68-69.
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS §22 (1961); see PROSSER, supra note 24, at 39.
193. Kline v. Kline, 64 N.E. 9, 10 (Ind. 1902).
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fendant's acts at the time of the assault to recover;1 94 therefore he must
be present as well. In cases of transferred intent, 195 the plaintiff must
suffer actual apprehension of harm due to the defendant's conduct.
The plaintiff must, therefore, observe the actions of the defendant at
the time of the threats, no matter toward whom they are directed.' 96
Similarly, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a
strictly mental invasion,'97 even if physical harm results. In actions for
assault, an element needed for recovery is apprehension of imminent
physical contact from the defendant's acts. 198 While damages for emo-
tional distress may be recovered for threats of future harm, '9 9 the plain-
tiff still must be present at the time of the defendant's threats.2 0 0
Therefore, a plaintiffs mental distress should generally be a valid cause
of action only when the defendant's tortious conduct is directly ob-
served or heard by the plaintiff.20'
In judging injury from emotional distress, the exact circumstances of
the plaintiff's perception of the tortious conduct are important.202 Indi-
viduals who hear later accounts of tortious conduct cannot be expected
to be affected as greatly as if they had directly observed the defendant's
acts.20 3 In an action for assault, when the plaintiff no longer has an
actual fear of bodily contact, his apprehension of harm must necessar-
ily decrease. The same is true for emotional distress; later accounts of
the defendant's conduct cannot have the same impact on the plaintiff's
psyche as direct observation. 2° Of course, an account of a death or
other tragedy may be so outrageous that the words themselves are con-
sidered tortious and directed toward the recipient of the news. 20 5
194. If the defendant aims a gun at a person who is unaware of it at the time, it is not assault.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §22, illustration 2 (1961).
195. See Jeppsen v. Jensen, 155 P. 429, 430 (Utah 1916) (defendant assaulted plaintiff's hus-
band while he was in the same room as the plaintiff).
196. See supra note 194; see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §32, comment b, illus-
tration 3 (1961).
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46, comment b (1961); PROSSER, supra note 24, at
49.
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §24 (1961).
199. See State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 335-36, 240 P.2d 282,
384-85 (1952).
200. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §22, comment a (1961) with id. §46, comment 1.
201. The plaintiff need not necessarily need strictly present, but in sufficient proximity to
strongly perceive the defendant's acts. Cf. Phillips v. Dickerson, 85 Ill. 11, 12-13 (1877); Goddard
v. Waters, 82 S.E. 304, 304 (Ga. 1914).
202. See Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury: Legal Liabilityfor Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L.
REV. 193, 254 (1944).
203. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §22, comment a (1961) with id. §46, com-
ment j.
204. See Smith, supra note 202, at 254. Of course, the plaintiff must suffer emotional distress
himself and cannot recover "vicariously" for someone else's mental anguish. See generally RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §46 (1961) (elements of intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
205. See, e.g., Wood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 404 F.2d 162, 166 (10th Cir. 1968).
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As previously discussed, cases of emotional distress involve harm to
the plaintiffs nervous system.20 6 Since this may be caused in an almost
infinite number of ways, courts have grappled with the problem of
placing reasonable limits on a defendant's liability, particularly when
the defendant's conduct was not directed at the plaintiff. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court considered this problem at length in the negligence
case of Dillon v. Legg. When the defendant's conduct is merely negli-
gent toward the third person and the plaintiff suffers resulting emo-
tional distress, the court presented a set of guidelines to determine the
liability of the defendant. In the next section, this comment will ex-
amine the use of those guidelines to apply transferred intent in cases of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
B. Application of Transferred Intent in Cases of Emotional Distress
Based on the Guidelines of Dillon v. Legg
In Dillon v. Legg,2 °7 the plaintiffs infant daughter, while lawfully
crossing a street, was run over by a car driven negligently by the de-
fendant. The tragedy was witnessed by the plaintiff mother while in
"close proximity" to the child.2 °s In overturning the rule that plaintiffs
must be within the "zone of danger" to recover for emotional distress
caused by the negligence of the defendant,20 9 the court held that a
plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress so long as the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff. This holding was based on fore-
seeability of risk:210 "Duty, in other words, is measured by the scope of
the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably entails."' 21 1 The court set
guidelines to determine whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty in cases of emotional distress when the plaintiff witnessed the de-
fendant's negligent acts toward a third person:2
1 2
1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident;
2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact
upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of
the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others
after its occurrence;
3) Whether plaintiff and primary victim were closely related.
These guidelines were ostensibly set to determine foreseeability of
harm to the plaintiff based upon the concept of duty. Duty, however, is
206. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text; see also Smith, supra note 202, at 212-26.
207. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
208. Id. at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
209. Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
210. Id. at 739-40, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
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not an old and deep-rooted doctrine, rather it is a legal device devel-
oped in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and designed to curtail
the fear that the law might countenance legal redress for unlimited
foreseeable harm.2"' The court noted that a denial of duty by courts
"emanates from the twin fears that courts will be flooded with an on-
slaught of (1) fraudulent and (2) indefinable claims. ' 214 These are the
identical policy reasons used by courts to deny application of trans-
ferred intent to cases of intentional infliction of emotional distress.215
The California Supreme Court defined the limits of liability using these
guidelines to ensure that a recovery for emotional distress resulting
from negligent conduct directed at a third person would not allow the
plaintiff to bring an unjustified cause of action claiming emotional dis-
tress or place a burden of unlimited liability on the defendant.21 6 This
comment proposes that the guidelines applied by the Dillon court to
cases of negligent infliction of emotional distress should also be used to
determine the defendant's liability when transferred intent is applied in
cases of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
C. Use of Dillon Guidelines to Limit Defendant's Liability
The guidelines proposed by the Dillon court to determine the duty of
the defendant are actually arbitrary standards in relation to the foresee-
ability of risk. 17 Many foreseeable victims may be denied recovery
because their cases do not fall within the Dillon guidelines.2 t8 The
guidelines do not appear to be a determination of foreseeability, rather
they are additional guarantees of the sincerity of the plaintiff's emo-
tional distress and place limits on liability due to the nature of the
injury.219
Unrestricted application of transferred intent to cases of intentional
infliction of emotional distress would impose practically unlimited lia-
213. Id. at 734, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
214. Id. at 735, 441 P.2d at 917, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
215. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
216. Compare 68 Cal. 2d at 734-35, 441 P.2d at 916-17, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76-77 with id. at 740,
441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
217. See Pearson, R., Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-A
Comment on the Nature ofArbitrary Rules, 34 UNIV. OF FLA. L. REv. 477, 490-501 (1982).
218. See Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1975). Plain-
tiff's child suffered brain damage, blindness, and ultimately became a quadriplegic after undergo-
ing oral surgery allegedly performed negligently by the defendant. The court ruled that plaintiff
could not recover because she was in the waiting room of the defendant's office while the surgery
was being performed and did not fit within the Dillon guidelines. Id. at 543-44, 119 Cal. Rptr. at
642; cf. Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977). The plaintiff
was allowed to recover although he did not actually see his wife struck by the defendant's automo-
bile. Id. at 76, 562 P.2d at 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
219. Compare supra text accompanying notes 213-16, with Pearson, supra note 217, at 500-01.
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bility on defendants for consequences of their tortious acts.220 Unlike
most traditional intentional tort cases, the injury of emotional distress
may be separated by long periods of time and great lengths in distance
from the defendant's acts that caused the mental injury.22' This be-
comes particularly true when defendants are held liable for the unin-
tended consequences of their tortious acts.22 Defendants are not held
liable for all the consequences of their tortious conduct, even if their
acts are intended to cause harm. 23 The Dillon guidelines are applica-
ble to limit the defendant's liability in cases of transferred intent be-
cause they were specifically designed to prevent unlimited liability for
infliction of emotional distress. 224 This comment proposes that the
guidelines only be used as a starting point in applying transferred in-
tent to cases of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Dillon,
the defendant's conduct was not intentionally tortious, but only negli-
gent toward the third person. 25 In cases of intentionally inflicted harm
the defendant's liability is expanded to the more remote consequences
of his acts. 26
The traditional intentional torts usually take place within a very
small space of time and distance. The defendant shoots a gun and the
bullet immediately strikes the plaintiff. When the defendant's inten-
tional act causing the plaintiffs injury is separated in time or space
from the tortious invasion, as happens more often in cases of emotional
distress, courts have had no trouble in linking together the defendant's
intent to cause harm and the harm itself22 7 In the next section, this
comment will demonstrate that this link between cause and effect, if
uninterrupted, should serve as the basis for an exception in application
of the Dillon guidelines to cases of transferred intent for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
D. An Exception to Use of the Dillon Guidelines
In cases of the traditional intentional torts, courts have had little
problem in linking tortious injury with earlier acts intended to cause
220. Magruder, supra note 23, at 1043, n.40; see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46,
comment 1 (1961).
221. See generally Magruder, supra note 23, at 1042-45.
222. See infra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Hofrichter, 116 S.W.2d 599, 600-01 (Ark. 1938)
(defendant who forced a mother to go with him to look at a gas meter was not liable for injuries
suffered by her baby who, while the mother was gone, had swallowed a safety pin). See generally
Note, supra note 133, at 365-68.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 214, 219.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 207-10.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 140-47, PROSSER, supra note 24, at 30-31; see also
Smith, supra note 202, at 270-71.
227. See infra cases cited in notes 228, 232, 235.
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harm. In Katko v. Briney,228 the defendant set up a spring-gun in his
unoccupied house so that it would wound any intruder.2 29 Several
weeks later, the gun blew off the plaintiffs leg as he was opening a door
in the house.23 ° The court held the defendant liable for a battery.231
Although the tortious act took place at the time the gun discharged and
the bullet invaded the plaintiffs body, the actual cause of the injury
was the defendant's earlier act of setting up the trap gun. Thus, the
defendant is still liable when the harm is the direct result of his earlier
intentionally tortious act.
Courts have also linked together the tortious interference with earlier
causes of the harm when the defendant intended to cause severe emo-
tional distress. In Blakeley v. Shortal's Estate,232 the defendant killed
himself in the plaintiffs kitchen where the plaintiff discovered his mu-
tiliated body later that day.233 The defendant's estate was held liable
for the plaintiffs resulting emotional distress. The court reasoned that
the defendant knew to a high probability the plaintiff would find his
body and therefore must have intended to cause the plaintiff emotional
distress by committing suicide in her kitchen.2 34 The earlier act of de-
fendant, which caused the plaintiffs emotional distress, was linked to-
gether with the plaintiffs later perception of the act to make the
defendant liable for his tortious conduct.235
The concept of linking acts intended to cause tortious consequences
with the directly resulting tort invasion itself can also be accomplished
using transferred intent. Although in Katko and Blakeley, the defend-
ants more or less intended to cause a foreseeable type of harm,236 this
comment has already demonstrated that foreseeability of harm should
not be a limiting factor in applying transferred intent to cases of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.237 Removing the limitation of
foreseeability, a defendant's intent to cause injury is extended to unfore-
seeable harm caused by his conduct. Thus, when the plaintiff is a wit-
ness to the physical results of the defendant's conduct before any
intervening acts break the chain of causation, the defendant's intent
can be transferred from his original tortious act to the plaintiffs result-
228. 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971).
229. Id. at 658.
230. Id. at 658-59.
231. Id. at 658. (Intent was not an issue in the case); see id. at 662-63 (dissenting opinion).
232. 20 N.W.2d 28 (Iowa 1945); see also Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A.2d 923, 926-27 (Md. 1951).
233. 20 N.W. 2d at 29-30.
234. Id. at 29; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46, comment i (1961).
235. 20 N.W.2d at 31; see also Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Roch, 153 A. 22 (Md. 1930) (defend-
ant grocer wrapped a dead rat in a package instead of a loaf of bread and sent it to the plaintiff
who recovered for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
236. See 183 N.W. at 662-63 (dissenting opinion); 20 N.W.2d at 29.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 171-85.
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ing emotional distress. The defendant's acts must directly cause the
plaintiff's injuries, otherwise, no recovery should be allowed.238
The facts of Koontz v. Keller239 provide an example of an application
of this concept. In Koontz, the defendant brutally murdered the plain-
tiffs sister, leaving the body in the plaintiffs backyard where it was
later discovered by the plaintiff.24 The court held that the plaintiff
could not recover because the defendant did not intend to cause the
decedent's sister emotional distress. 241 Applying transferred intent,
however, the defendant's intent to kill the plaintiffs sister can be cou-
pled with the plaintiffs resulting emotional distress to render the de-
fendant liable. Although the plaintiff was not present at the time of the
tortious conduct, she personally witnessed the direct results of the de-
fendant's actions, establishing a chain of causal relation.242 The defend-
ant's intent to cause harm is transferred to the plaintiffs emotional
distress so long as no other event intervenes and acts as a cause of the
harm.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of transferred intent embodies a trend in the courts to
hold an intentional wrongdoer responsible for even remote conse-
quences of his harmful acts.243 When a person suffers severe emotional
distress caused by the defendant, however, the law consistently has re-
fused to allow a transfer of the defendant's tortious intent to the inno-
cent person's resulting emotional distress. Although the history of the
doctrine suggests that transferred intent should not be limited to the
traditional intentional torts, courts have not applied the doctrine to the
new tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
238. Cf. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Hofrichter, 116 S.W.2d 599, 600-01 (Ark. 1938); Peo-
ple v. Rockwell, 39 Mich. 503, 504 (1878). Even in cases of negligence, if no new cause of harm
intervenes between the defendant's wrong and the plaintiff's injury, courts do not hesitate to allow
a recovery although the harm could not have been foreseen. See Carpenter, Workable Rules For
Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CAL. L. REv. 229, 241 (1932).
239. 3 N.E.2d 694 (Ohio 1936).
240. Id. at 695.
241. Id. at 696.
242. "The shock of seeing a child severely injured immediately after the tortious event may be
just as profound as that experienced in witnessing the accident itself." Archibald v. Braverman,
275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, 725 (1969). A clear illustration of the limits of a
defendant's liability are the facts of the recent case of Calliari v. Sugar, 435 A.2d 139 (N.J. 1980).
Purchasers of a house brought suit against the vendor claiming damages for intentional infliction
of emotional distress allegedly resulted from the plaintiffs discovery of the body of the vendor's
wife buried in the back yard of the property and from plaintiff's belief that she was murdered by
the vendor. The defendant's tortious intent toward his wife could not be transferred to the plain-
tiff's resulting emotional distress because plaintiff neither witnessed the defendant's conduct nor
did the plaintiff observe the direct results since there were intervening acts of burial and disinter-
ment. The limitation on plaintiffs recovery is the same as in most other intentional torts: natural
consequences of the defendant's acts. See supra note 238.
243. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 662.
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The modem public policy reasons that support application of trans-
ferred intent should be used to expand the application of the doctrine
to cases of emotional distress, so long as reasonable limitations are
placed on the liability of the defendant. This comment has suggested
that application of the guidelines announced in Dillon v. Legg is an
appropriate means of restricting liability because these guidelines were
designed to meet the specific problem of unlimited liability inherent in
torts of emotional distress. The public policies of preventing unlimited
liability and eliminating fraudulent claims are satisfied by the reason-
able application of the transferred intent doctrine in cases of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.
Peter H. Mixon
